Editor’s Corner: Why an AstraZeneca-Bristol Myers Squibb merger is a bad idea

Pharma Editor’s Corner: Why an AstraZeneca-Bristol Myers Squibb merger is a bad idea By Angus Liu Aug 3, 2026 12:25am Bristol Myers Squibb AstraZeneca mergers and acquisitions Deals It’s been years since Big Pharma last witnessed a megamerger. In the late 2010s, Takeda bought Shire, AbbVie acquired Allergan, and Bristol Myers Squibb swallowed Celgene. While those $60 billion-plus transactions reshaped the biopharma landscape, a new idea making the rounds on Wall Street would make all of them look like pocket change.

On Sunday, the Financial Times reported that AstraZeneca and BMS have held discussions about a potential combination between the two that would create a new behemoth valued at nearly $400 billion. No other details have been reported beyond the fact that talks have taken place. At first glance, joining forces with BMS would bolster AZ’s footprint in the U.S., while bringing over AZ’s portfolio—which the British company expects to surge from $55.6 billion in 2025 revenue to $80 billion in 2030—could easily add growth momentum to BMS.

In reality, an AZ-BMS merger would likely be a disaster. Combining the two drugmakers would trigger severe regulatory concerns and significant pipeline disruptions, not to mention cost numerous jobs, all while damaging the broader biopharma ecosystem and hurting patients. Acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry thrive on strategic expansions—entering a new therapeutic area, capturing a novel technology platform, growing geographically, or replacing a patent cliff.

A union between AZ and BMS can yield a fraction of those benefits but represents the worst possible remedy for otherwise surmountable hurdles. To see what a legitimate “buying scale” looks like, one need only go back eight years. Takeda’s $62 billion acquisition of Shire gave the Japanese pharma a major rare disease portfolio, with geographic expansion a central driver.

When the deal was struck in 2018, Takeda lagged far behind industry heavyweights, carrying a rather limited presence in the U.S. beyond just a couple of key products such as Entyvio. So, buying scale made sense for Takeda.

In contrast, AstraZeneca does not have a U.S. void. Last year, the U.S.

made up 43% of AZ’s total product revenue, and the company has planned $50 billion in U.S. investment by 2030, with some expansions already underway. Rather than requiring a megadeal to break through in the U.S., AZ can simply grow its U.S.

presence organically, just like its European peer Novartis is doing. True, BMS is heavily U.S.-centric. But combining the two wouldn’t unlock any new growth regions; instead, it would merely create an operationally overlapping monster in the same market.

The repetition problem goes beyond geographic footprint. While Shire provided Takeda with major diversification in rare diseases, the portfolio overlaps between AZ and BMS is jarring, setting the stage for antitrust nightmares and cannibalization. Among the most glaring roadblocks are checkpoint inhibitors.

BMS and AZ market the only two commercial anti-CTLA-4 agents, Yervoy and Imjudo, and the two firms’ anti-PD-(L)1 antibodies Opdivo and Imfinzi, target some of the same indications, too. In cell therapy, AZ just pushed its BCMAxCD19 dual-targeting CAR-T therapy, AZD0120, into phase 3 tests in previously treated and first-line multiple myeloma, potentially threatening BMS’ BCMA-directed Abecma. Meanwhile, BMS’ EGFRxHER3 antibody-drug conjugate, izalontamab brengitecan, represents a potential direct rival to AZ’s TROP2 ADC Datroway in breast cancer and lung cancer.

The two firms’ similar therapeutic interests—and their sheer size—scream antitrust concerns. To satisfy regulators and remove repetitive work, aggressive R&D reshuffling and program reprioritization are expected. Promising molecules would be shelved purely to satisfy corporate targets, reducing the number of therapies that could reach patients.

Besides, even considering that BMS’ chief medical officer, Cristian Massacesi, M.D., just joined a year ago from a similar position at AZ, the years-long process of reconciling two massive drug R&D engines creates immense drag, causing delays in development timelines, which neither company can afford in a highly competitive environment. To justify the deal math, companies often point to cost synergies. Translation: layoffs, a signature move of megamergers.

Back in 1998, the merger between Britain’s Zeneca and Sweden’s Astra, which created the AstraZeneca we know today, was expected to eliminate around 6,000 jobs from the combined workforce. Compared to the rumored AZ-BMS deal, Zeneca’s business, best known for cancer medicines, was considered more complementary to Astra’s portfolio, which was led by the stomach acid drug Prilosec. As of 2025, AZ employed 96,100 employees worldwide and BMS had about 32,500 staffers.

In an industry that already saw over 22,000 job reductions across major pharmas, combining AZ and BMS would only add to the pain, resulting in thousands of duplicate positions waiting to be eliminated across commercial, scientific, production and administrative divisions, plus potential site closures. An AZ-BMS merger wouldn’t just reshape the two companies involved; it would send shockwaves across the broader biopharma industry. A megadeal of this scale would deal a blow to the biotech M&A sentiment.

When Big Pharma allocates $100 billion-plus toward consolidating megacap peers, it would signal a retreat to financial engineering, in which short-term cost synergies are preferred over more fine-tuned pursuit of genuine innovation. History has repeatedly shown that massive pharma consolidations rarely generate long-term value compared to targeted biotech acquisitions. To cope with the imminent loss of exclusivity of Lipitor, Pfizer bought Wyeth in in 2009 for $68 billion, a deal that was marked by an easy revenue bump and massive job cuts.

However, beyond the immediate top-line growth, the merger didn’t deliver sustained R&D productivity, as the New York pharma would make a hostile takeover attempt at AZ just five years later. Whether Takeda’s move on Shire was worthwhile remains debatable, too. Despite its gain in commercial scale, the Japanese pharma was weighed down with heavy debts for a long time, significantly limiting its flexibility to pursue other biotech deals.

For AZ and BMS, both companies could far better achieve their strategic goals by deploying capital into biotechs and licensing deals. AZ has already stated that it doesn’t need M&A to reach its $80 billion revenue target by 2030. For a mature company like AZ, legacy commercial infrastructure does not add much value.

The instant reaction from Jefferies analysts to yesterday's reports chimes with this view. The analysts described themselves as “a bit perplexed by the news.” “Of course financial accretion can look good and maybe more cash generation would allow for more R&D,” the analysts added in their note this morning. “But if there is one company that doesn't need financial engineering, it's AZ in our view.” Facing looming patent cliffs on Opdivo and Eliquis, BMS needs better clinical-stage deals, much like the string of acquisitions it struck in late 2023.

Granted, impending patent losses represent an industry-wide headache, and derisked, late-stage assets rarely come cheap and do not guarantee success. But overpaying for a biotech pipeline would likely still be a better option than absorbing a Big Pharma peer as a defense strategy. A megadeal with AstraZeneca could lift BMS’ revenue, but it would also compound operational liabilities while risking the very R&D engine required to secure its future.

- Angus LiuDeputy Editor, Fierce Pharma Bristol Myers Squibb AstraZeneca mergers and acquisitions Deals Pharma